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Private Ownership and Limits to
Retroactive Regulation of Utility Rates
Louis DE ALESSI*
The author critically evaluates the effect of retroactive
ratemaking on regulated public utilities, particularly the costs
and disincentives inherent in the process. If the trend is not
corrected, the author suggests that public utilities will ulti-
mately become much like nationalized industries, with consum-
ers bearing the risk and regulators managing the firm.
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I. Introduction
State regulation of public utilities is becoming an increasingly
important national issue. Although the degree of regulation has va-
ried greatly from industry to industry as well as over time and
across states, until recently the economic consequences of state
regulation have been relatively minor and localized.1 In the past
few years, however, a persistently high rate of inflation, the emer-
gence of activist consumer interest groups, and increasingly perva-
sive federal policies have combined to raise the possibility of seri-
* Professor of Economics, Law and Economics Center, University of Miami. B.A. 1954,
M.A. 1955, Ph.D. 1961, University of California, Los Angeles. This research was supported
in part by a grant from the Law and Economics Center of the University of Miami. Mark C.
Taylor, Timothy J. Muris, Robert J. Staaf, and John J. Diehl offered helpful comments.
1. See, e.g., De Alessi, An Economic Analysis of Government Ownership and Regula-
tion: Theory and the Evidence from the Electric Power Industry, 19 PUB. CHOICE 1 (1974);
Stigler & Friedland, What Can the Regulators Regulate? The Case of Electricity, 5 J.L. &
ECON. 1 (1962).
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ous disruption in the provision of utility services.2  The
introduction of retroactive ratemakings threatens to impose further
strains on utilities.
Inflation is an increase in the general level of prices, including
the prices of inventories and capital assets. During inflationary pe-
riods, business accounting records-which reflect historical
costs-sytematically understate the value of assets acquired in pre-
ceding periods. This phenomenon is particularly significant in the
case of public utilities because their production is so highly capital
intensive. Thus, if a utility's allowed rate of return is tied to a rate
base that understates the increase in asset prices, then the utility's
real earnings will be insufficient to compensate investors, maintain
the capital stock, and attract new funds for system expansion.4
Recently, the disruptive effects of inflation have been com-
pounded by the emergence of consumer groups that have pres-
sured regulatory agencies to limit price increases. 5 To the extent,
however, that these consumer groups have succeeded in preventing
output prices from keeping pace with increases in the opportunity
cost of the resources used in production, this apparent gain to con-
sumers has been deceptive. To maintain production, utilities have
had to reduce costs. In many cases, cost reductions have been ob-
tained by lowering the quality of output,' decreasing maintenance,
and postponing equipment replacement, thereby depleting capital
stock7 and increasing the prospective severity and frequency of
system failures (e.g., blackouts). Moreover, the increased national
interdependence of electric utilities suggests that some of the dis-
ruptions will have national as well as regional impact.' In this con-
2. The Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, a statisti-
cal measure of the average change in prices of a fixed market basket of goods and services,
more than doubled between 1972 and 1981 from 125.3 to 281.1. See 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV.,
March 1982, at 57-77. At the same time, the ascendancy of self-annointed consumer groups
combined with swings in national policies relating to matters such as the environment, oil,
and nuclear power to buffet individual utilities. See, e.g., Navarro, Electric Utility Regula-
tion and National Policy, 4 REG. 20 (1981).
3. Retroactive ratemaking refers to the authority of a public utility commission to re-
view a utility's rate structure and to reduce a utility's prices retroactively to the date the
rate proceedings began.
4. See Navarro, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. For example, more frequent and longer service interruptions represent a deteriora-
tion in the quality of the electric power delivered to users.
7. Allocating fewer resources to the maintenance of capital assets subjects the assets to
more rapid wear that reduces their useful life and, therefore, their market value.
8. National disruptions are possible because electric power companies effectively are
tied into a national grid. Individual utilities typically buy and sell electric power depending
[Vol. 37:433
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text, the introduction of retroactive ratemaking has disturbing
overtones.
Over the last forty years, a number of state public service
commissions have sought the authority to reduce retroactively the
prices charged by the utilities they supervise." Retroactive rate re-
duction authority permits a commission to direct a utility to set
aside a portion of its current revenue pending the outcome of a full
rate investigation. If the investigation reveals that the rate of re-
turn actually earned by the utility exceeds the rate newly allowed
by the commission, the commission can then establish a lower
structure of tariffs and order the utility to refund all revenues at-
tributable to the tariff differential that were collected since the be-
ginning of the rate proceedings.
Until recently, commissions have failed to obtain the authority
to change rates retroactively. The Supreme Court of the United
States and various state high courts have ruled that the appropri-
ate enabling statutes did not sanction retroactive rate reductions, 10
and state legislatures have resisted pressures to amend the stat-
utes. Recent events in Florida, however, suggest that the tide may
be turning."
on, inter alia, daily and seasonal variations in demand and production. Local equipment
failures could thus affect other companies tied into the grid, triggering equipment failures
elsewhere.
9. E.g., Public Utils. Comm'n v. United Fuel Gas Co., 317 U.S. 456 (1943) (Ohio Public
Utilities Commission attempted to fix retroactively the rates to be charged by an interstate
company for natural gas sold in interstate commerce to a local utility); Pacific Tel. & Tel.
Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 62 Cal. 2d 634, 401 P.2d 353, 44 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1965) (California
Public Utilities Commission attempted to roll back a utility's prior-approved general rates
and to order a refund); City of Miami v. Florida Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 208 So. 2d 249 (Fla.
1968) (city unsuccessfully argued that commission had power to reduce rates retroactively);
Michigan Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 315 Mich. 533, 24 N.W.2d
200 (1946) (telephone company sought review of Public Service Commission's order to re-
fund $3,500,000 pro rata to subscribers to reduce 1944 gross revenues).
10. California, Florida, Michigan, and Ohio statutorily provided that the public service
commissions set rates prospectively. See cases cited supra note 9; accord Mountain States
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. New Mexico State Corp. Comm'n, 90 N.M. 325, 563 P.2d 588 (1977)
(authority of utilities commission is solely legislative and necessarily prospective, not
retroactive).
11. On October 6, 1978, the Florida Public Service Commission issued Order 8513 initi-
ating a formal investigation of United Telephone Company's rates and charges. At the same
time, Public Counsel filed a petition requesting that the Commission reduce United's prices
so that the firm's rate of return did not exceed its allowed rate. In the oral presentation,
Public Counsel urged that all of United's current income in excess of the amount permitted
by the allowed rate be set aside and made subject to refund at the end of the investigation.
Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n Investigation of United Tel. Co., Order 8513, No. 78077-TP.
On May 1, 1979, following hearings on the request, the Commission issued Interim Or-
der 8855, which, claiming section 364.14 of the Florida Statutes as autahority, directed
19831
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Retroactive ratemaking reduces the incentive of regulated util-
ities to operate efficiently. The economic analysis and the evidence
presented here suggest that retroactive ratemaking produces the
following results: higher production costs; less incentive to develop
and adopt cost-reducing and product-improving innovations; less
incentive to adopt more cost-related prices; and the transfer of
some risk-bearing and monitoring functions from shareholders to
consumers and commissioners. In the long run, consumers will pay
higher prices for lower quality output. Inflation will exacerbate
these consequences and threaten the ability of utilities not only to
serve consumers but, indeed, to survive.
This paper examines the economic consequences of retroactive
ratemaking and notes the evidence available, thus aiding legisla-
tures and courts to reach more informed decisions. Section II con-
tains a brief summary of the institutional setting and the theoreti-
cal framework. Section III discusses some of the more important
economic consequences of retroactive ratemaking and compares
them with the available evidence. Section IV contains a few con-
cluding remarks.
II. ECONOMIC THEORY AND THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING OF PUBLIC
UTILITIES
A public utility is whatever the members of the appropriate
legislature choose to define as such.12 State legislatures typically
United to set aside $3.3 million annually for possible refund pending the outcome of the full
rate investigation.
On November 6, 1979, the Commission issued Interim Order 9133 requesting Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company to set aside $68.5 million annually pending comple-
tion of a full rate investigation.
On January 14, 1980, at the conclusion of United's proceedings, the Commission issued
Final Order 9208, which required United to refund all receipts in excess of a newly estab-
lished allowed rate of return of 9.62%. The refund was to be retroactive to May 1, 1979, the
date Order 8855 was issued. United filed suit, Southern Bell subsequently joined, and the
case went to the Supreme Court of Florida.
Before the court rendered its decision, however, the Florida Legislature amended the
pertinent statutes and granted the Commission authority to set rates retroactively. See 1980
Fla. Laws ch. 80-36 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 364.055 (1981)). Thus, the legislature limited
the Florida Supreme Court decision's impact and the case was settled out of court. Accord-
ingly, it is not known whether judicial opinion had also shifted.
As late as 1978, in a ranking of bond ratings, Florida was one of only nine states consid-
ered to have a very "favorable" climate with respect to regulation by the public utility com-
mission. See, e.g., Navarro, supra note 2, at 22.
12. Why and how certain firms should be regulated as public utilities continues to be
debated. See, e.g., Demsetz, On the Regulation of Industry: A Reply, 79 J. POL. ECON. 356
(1971); Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11 J.L. & EcON. 55 (1968); Telser, On the Regula-
[Vol. 37:433
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delegate the regulation of public utilities to independent commis-
sions, and the enabling statutes are remarkably similar among
states. 3 Typically, a commission has the authority to control entry,
to set the geographical boundary of a utility's monopoly, to specify
the costs that the utility is allowed to take into account in deter-
mining its net revenue and rate base, to set the output prices that
the utility may charge, and to establish the maximum rate of re-
turn that the utility can earn, i.e., the allowed rate."
To enforce its policies, a commission can review a utility's ac-
counting records and business practices. If the commission finds
that the actual rate of return earned by a utility exceeds the al-
lowed rate, it may initiate formal ratemaking proceedings. At. the
conclusion of these proceedings, the commission may increase the
allowed rate of return or decrease the structure of prices, or both,
with any changes applying prospectively. The utility may also ap-
ply to the commission for changes in its allowed rate and prices."
Within these limits, managers of public utilities traditionally have
been relatively free to maximize the wealth of the utility's own-
ers-its shareholders."
A commission ordinarily reviews a utility's costs and revenues
only periodically. As a result, lags may occur during which the ac-
tual rate of return may exceed the allowed rate. The existence of
this regulatory lag provides managers of public utilities with the
incentive to reduce costs and increase revenues. Managers then are
able to increase shareholders' wealth, concurrently serving consum-
ers' long-term interests."
Retroactive ratemaking reduces regulatory lag and, if fully and
continuously enforced, could eliminate the lag entirely. With retro-
tion of Industry: A Note, 77 J. POL. ECON. 937 (1969).
In the past, normative prescriptions have not been the dominant factor in determining
why and how certain firms were regulated as public utilities. See, e.g., Jarrell, The Demand
for State Regulation of the Electric Utility Industry, 21 J.L. & ECON. 269 (1978); Peltzman,
Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 3 (1971).
For a more detailed review and discussion of the issue raised in the text, see R.
SCHMALENSEE, THE CONTROL OF NATURAL MONOPOLIES (1979).
13. Most states have modeled their statutes after those enacted by New York and Wis-
consin. See Jarrell, supra note 12, at 270-71.
14. E.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 366 (1981).
15. A utility may also request an interim rate increase (or decrease) subject to final
approval following a full rate investigation. If a price increase is then found to have been
excessive, the utility must refund the differential.
16. See, e.g., R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 12, at 40-42.
17. See, e.g., Baumol & Klevorick, Input Choices and Rate of Return Regulation: An
Overview of the Discussion, 1 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 162, 182-89 (1970).
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activity, the hypothesis that managers seek to maximize share-
holders' wealth implies that managers will have more incentive to
keep the actual rate of return from falling below the allowed rate.
Managers no longer would have the incentive, however, to strive
for a rate of return exceeding the allowed rate, because the differ-
ential would be taxed away retroactively through offsetting
changes in output prices. Indeed, this retroactive tax weakens
shareholders' rights, and implies that utility-maximizing managers
will have greater opportunity to engage in cost-increasing and
other activities designed to enhance their own wealth, ease their
workloads, and otherwise promote their own welfare at the expense
of consumers' and shareholders' interests."8
The authority to change rates retroactively also affects the in-
centive structure of utility-maximizing commissioners. Retroactive
ratemaking transfers some of the risk-bearing and monitoring
functions from shareholders to consumers and to the commission.19
Shareholders effectively become bondholders, although without a
corresponding tax advantage to consumers.2 0 Concurrently, com-
missioners would be induced to become more involved in the util-
ity's day-to-day decisionmaking process, in the limit taking over
the full range of traditional managerial functions. Such participa-
tion in management by commissions would have many of the at-
tributes of government ownership of public utilities and would
yield similar economic consequences.2
Much theoretical and empirical work has been undertaken
concerning the behavior of utility-maximizing regulators and regu-
lated utilities.2 2 Although much remains to be done, this research
provides a framework for examining certain tentative implications
18. The seminal article on the application of the utility-maximization hypothesis to
regulated firms is Alchian & Kessel, Competition, Monopoly, and the Pursuit of Money, in
ASPECTS OP LABOR ECONOMICS 157 (1962). For a review of the subsequent literature, see
generally R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 12, and De Alessi, The Economics of Property
Rights: A Review of the Evidence, 2 RESEARCH L. ECON. 1 (1980). Note that the allocation of
resources, not merely the distribution of wealth, is at issue.
19. See infra text accompanying note 47.
20. To the extent that the rate of return to shareholders remains constant through the
retroactive manipulation of prices to users, shareholders effectively become bondholders.
For tax purposes, however, payments to shareholders are not considered a cost of doing
business and thus are not deductible from gross receipts in computing a firm's taxable in-
come. In contrast, payments to bondholders are tax deductible. Because retroactive
ratemaking does not affect the taxation of payments to shareholders, the effective transfor-
mation of shareholders into bondholders does not yield a corresponding tax advantage to
consumers.
21. See, e.g., De Alessi, supra note 1; Peltzman, supra note 12; Stigler, supra note 12.




III. CONSEQUENCES OF RETROACTIVE RATE REDUCTIONS
Retroactive rate reductions either decrease or eliminate regu-
latory lag, thereby lowering the effective rate of return that a util-
ity is allowed to earn and thus imposing a more binding constraint
on the firm's profits. The imposition of a more binding profit con-
straint, in turn, will result in higher production costs; inhibit tech-
nological innovations and product improvements; reduce the incen-
tive to establish cost-related price structures; encourage utilities to
seek more interim price changes; increase the cost of ratemaking
proceedings; increase price uncertainty; deplete capital during in-
flationary periods; reduce investors' wealth; transfer risk-bearing
from investors to consumers; and transfer the monitoring function
from investors to the commission. These consequences of a more
binding profit constraint are discussed below.
A. Increased Production Costs
A well-known implication of a binding profit constraint is that
the managers of a wealth-maximizing firm will adopt more capital-
intensive production techniques. 3 More precisely, if the allowed
rate of return is equal to or greater than the opportunity cost of
capital but less than the firm's unconstrained rate of return, then
the wealth-maximizing ratio of capital to labor will be greater than
the ratio which would have minimized production costs at the level
of output chosen.2 4 Substituting capital for labor and other re-
sources increases the rate base 6 and, over some range, allows
shareholders to capture returns that otherwise would be lost.
Setting the allowed rate of return closer to the cost of capital
further encourages overcapitalization. Although the proposition
may seem paradoxical, it has been derived rigorously 6 and is rea-
sonable on closer reflection. Decreasing the gap between the al-
lowed rate of return and the cost of capital expands the selection
23. For example, a firm may employ equipment that is either more automated or more
durable, thereby substituting capital for labor and other inputs used in operating and main-
taining the plant.
24. For a more rigorous statement and refinement of the analysis, see Baumol &
Klevorick, supra note 17. Averch and Johnson developed the original analysis in their arti-
cle in 52 AM. ECON. REv. 1052 (1962).
25. Some states measure the rate base or total invested capital as the original cost of
the firm's assets less depreciation. See R. SCHMALENSEE, supra note 12, at 28.
26. Baumol & Klevorick, supra note 17 at 174-76.
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of higher cost input combinations that managers can employ to
produce a given level of output. Accordingly, reducing this gap in-
creases managers' opportunities to use more capital-intensive pro-
duction techniques, resulting in greater deviations from the least-
cost input combinations.
Lowering prices retroactively, thereby keeping the actual rate
of return equal to or below the nominal allowed rate, lowers the
effective allowed rate. Moreover, if the nominal allowed rate of re-
turn is also lowered retroactively, then the profit constraint be-
comes even more binding. Thus, retroactive ratemaking implies
that managers of a wealth-maximizing firm will adopt a higher
capital-labor ratio at the output level chosen, thereby incurring
higher production costs.
The evidence relating to the overcapitalization hypothesis is
mixed, although it does suggest that a binding profit constraint re-
sults in higher production costs." One shortcoming of the test re-
sults is that they are based on data from the electric power indus-
try where regulation has been relatively weak. 8 As the profit
constraint becomes less binding, its effect on input proportions di-
minishes and it then becomes more difficult to detect in the pres-
ence of other phenomena.
A more fundamental problem with the overcapitalization hy-
pothesis is that it rests on the premise that managers maximize
shareholders' wealth. A binding profit constraint, however, weak-
ens shareholders' property rights by reducing their opportunity to
capture the benefits of monitoring managerial performance. Conse-
quently, less monitoring is supplied, managers gain discretionary
authority, and resources are used less efficiently.
27. Support 'for the overcapitalization hypothesis and for the related proposition that a
binding profit constraint leads to higher production costs is provided by Courville, Regula-
tion and Efficiency in the Electric Utility Industry, 5 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 53
(1974); Hayashi & Trapani, Rate of Return Regulation and the Regulated Firm's Choice of
Capital-Labor Ratio: Further Empirical Evidence on the Averch-Johnson Model, 42 S.
ECON. J. 384 (1976); Petersen, An Empirical Test of Regulatory Effects, 6 BELL J. ECON. 111
(1975); Spann, Rate of Return Regulation and Efficiency in Production: An Empirical Test
of the Averch-Johnson Thesis, 5 BELL J. EcoN. & MGMT. Sci. 38 (1974).
Other researchers failed to find any evidence of overcapitalization. See Baron & Tag-
gart, A Model of Regulation Under Uncertainty and a Test of Regulatory Bias, 8 BELL J.
EcoN. 151 (1977); Boyes, An Empirical Examination of the Averch-Johnson Effect, 14
EcoN. INQUIRY 25 (1976); Smithson, The Degree of Regulation and the Monopoly Firm:
Further Empirical Evidence, 44 S. ECON. J. 568 (1978). Even within this group, however,
Baron and Taggart found that regulated firms used inputs less efficiently, and Smithson
concluded that the weight of the evidence still indicated that regulation resulted in higher
production costs.
28. See, e.g., Jarrell, supra note 12; Stigler & Friedland, supra note 1.
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The evidence generally supports the implications of the util-
ity-maximization hypothesis.2 9 Thus, for example, stricter controls,
including those associated with outright government ownership,
have been associated with more discrimination in hiring, greater
variability in input proportions, longer managerial tenure, higher
wage and salary expenditures, and higher operating costs.30 Ac-
cordingly, it is riot surprising that the overcapitalization hypothesis
has received mixed empirical support.
On balance, the evidence reviewed indicates that a binding
profit constraint results in higher production costs. More impor-
tantly, a binding profit constraint also increases managers' discre-
tionary authority, leading to more discrimination in the hiring and
use of resources, more managerial perquisites, and related conse-
quences. Because retroactive ratemaking effectively makes the
profit constraint more binding, it will intensify the magnitude of
these effects.
B. Less Technological Innovation and Product Improvement
Regulatory lag provides the utility with a temporary opportu-
nity to earn returns in excess of the allowed rate. According to the
wealth-maximization hypothesis, managers will have the incentive
to develop and adopt innovations that reduce costs and improve
the quality of the product, increasing returns above the allowed
rate during the regulatory lag period. 1
To the extent that the profit constraint is binding, however,
managers will have some opportunity for discretion. Accordingly,
they will have less incentive to adopt cost-reducing and product-
improving innovations, and they will give their preferences more
weight in choosing the rate at which such innovations are
adopted. 2 It follows that retroactive ratemaking will result in a
lower rate of technological innovation and product improvement as
well as in greater variability in these rates among firms.
The evidence supports these implications. For example, elec-
tric utilities in states with stricter regulation incur smaller expend-
itures on research and development,3 3 while regulated privately
owned electric utilities adopt cost-reducing innovations more fre-
29. See De Alessi, supra note 18.
30. Id. at 27-42.
31. See Baumol & Klevorick, supra note 17.
32. See De Alessi, supra note 18.
33. See Sav, R & D Decisions Under Alternative Regulatory Constraints, 5 ATL. EcON.
J. 73 (1977).
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quently than do their municipally owned counterparts.3' Moreover,
municipally owned electric and water utilities provide less product
variety to consumers."
C. Reduced Incentive to Establish Cost-Related Price
Structures
Managers of a wealth-maximizing enterprise have the incen-
tive to tailor the firm's tariff structure to the demands and costs of
serving specific user groups. Accordingly, managers have the incen-
tive to revise tariff structures periodically in response to constantly
changing demand and supply conditions. Because retroactive rate
reductions diminish a utility's opportunity to reap the benefits
from these readjustments, the managers' incentive to establish and
maintain cost-related tariff structures is reduced.
There is indirect evidence to support this implication, using
government ownership as a proxy for stricter regulation of rates of
return. Thus, the prices charged particular customer groups are
more cost-related in the case of private than of municipal, electric
utilities s6 Moreover, the rates charged by privately owned electric
utilities to different user groups reflect the same relationship to
cost,37 whereas the rates charged by municipally owned electric
utilities are more cost-related for residential than for commercial
and industrial users. Indeed, it is the commercial and industrial
users who reap the main benefits from scale economies in the pro-
duction of electric power.8 8 Finally, regulated privately owned elec-
tric utilities use more tariffs designed to deal with the peak-load
problem than do municipally owned electric utilities.3 9
Taken together, these findings suggest that retroactive rate re-
ductions will result in tariff structures that reflect less accurately
the costs of serving individual user groups and that favor larger
34. See J. Tilton, The Nature of Firm Ownership and the Adoption of Innovations in
the Electric Power Industry (1973) (unpublished manuscript).
35. Peltzman, Pricing in Public and Private Enterprises: Electric Utilities in the
United States, 14 J.L. & EcoN. 109 (1971); J. Hansman, Urban Water Services Pricing:
Public vs Private Firms (Feb. 16, 1976) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Dep't of Econ.,
George Washington Univ.).
36. Peltzman, supra note 35.
37. Jackson, Regulation and Electric Utility Rate Levels, 45 LAND ECON. 372 (1969);
Mann & Mikesell, Tax Payments and Electric Utility Prices, 38 S. EcoN. J. 69 (1971).
38. Mann & Seifried, Pricing in the Case of Publicly-Owned Electric Utilities, 12 Q.
Rav. EcoN. Bus. 77 (1972).
39. De Alessi, Ownership and Peak-Load Pricing in the Electric Power Industry, 17 Q.
REv. EcoN. Bus. 7 (1977).
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commercial and industrial users relative to domestic users.
D. More Interim Price Changes
Managers of regulated firms have the incentive to request a
change in tariffs-whether up, down, or mixed-whenever the
change is expected to yield increased profits. When deciding on the
type and amount of tariff change to request, these managers must
consider several variables, including the change in revenue attribu-
table to the change in price and the resulting change in output; the
change in production costs due to the change in output; the cost of
presenting the utility's case before the commission to obtain the
tariff change; the cost of implementing the new rates; and the time
profile of the expected changes in the cost and revenue streams.
The magnitude of the changes in a utility's cost and revenue
streams and the length of time that such changes will persist, how-
ever, are difficult to ascertain. The values of the underlying vari-
ables that determine a utility's cost and revenue functions vary
continuously. Individual variations may be negligible or significant,
additive or offsetting. More importantly for present purposes, such
variations may be transitory or more lasting. Accordingly, manag-
ers of a regulated utility rationally will wait to apply for a change
in tariffs until it is clear that the net effect of the underlying
changes in circumstances is sufficiently large and enduring to jus-
tify the costs of a rate proceeding.4 As a result, over some periods
a utility's shareholders will accept a rate of return below the al-
lowed rate.
A commission, on the other hand, does not bear the costs of a
full rate proceeding in the same sense a utility does.41 Commission-
ers are not monitored by taxpayers and users as closely as utility
managers are monitored by shareholders. Moreover, commissioners
do not bear the wealth-consequences of their decisions as fully as
the utility's shareholders. Hence, commissioners are more respon-
sive to political pressures and to their own preferences. Having ac-
40. A similar analysis is applicable to those cases in which a commission permits a util-
ity to implement an interim tariff change at the utility's own volition, subject to refund if, at
the end of the full rate proceedings, the commission finds that the change was unjustified.
41. Members of a commission and their staff presumably would be at odds on the issue.
For example, the salaries of commissioners typically are fixed by the legislature, whereas the
salaries of the commission's staff typically increase with increases in the workload and the
number of employees supervised. See De Alessi,'supra note 1. As a result, members of the
staff would reap more benefits than commissioners from increased regulatory activity and
thus would seek to initiate more activity.
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quired the authority to impose interim rate reductions, commis-
sioners may be expected to use it, at least in some cases in which
the underlying economic changes are transitory or small. Given
pressure from consumerists and other public interest groups, com-
missioners will be inclined to review more frequently the actual
rates of return, and to revise tariff structures accordingly, in order
to inhibit the realized rate from exceeding the allowed rate.'
Interestingly, if the commission reviews rates more frequently,
the managers of the utility will then have more incentive to ensure
that the realized rate of return does not fall below the allowed rate.
Thus, these managers will be more likely to request interim rate
increases in response to even transitory changes in conditions. This
follows because the cost to the utility's shareholders of the addi-
tional ratemaking proceedings would now be paid out of profits
that, if not expended for this purpose, would be refunded to cus-
tomers and lost forever. The result would be an escalation in both
commission and utility-initiated rate proceedings, with correspond-
ingly increased costs to customers and taxpayers.
E. Higher Cost of Ratemaking Proceedings
The authority to reduce rates retroactively will result in an
increase in the resources allocated to ratemaking. First, ratemaking
proceedings will occur more frequently or, in the most extreme
case, continuously. Consequently, both the commission and the
utilities will incur increased ratemaking costs. Second, the funds
set aside pending the outcome of the ratemaking proceedings will
necessarily earn a lower rate of return than if they had been used
by the utility. This result follows because placing the funds aside
represents an additional constraint on the utility. The foregone re-
turn from these funds is an additional cost of operation. Third,
making refunds is costly. Thus, the utility must identify the recipi-
ents, compute the individual amounts due, and issue checks or
enter credits.
F. Increased Uncertainty
Retroactive ratemaking also results in increased uncertainty
during periods of rapid changes in the general level of prices. Al-
though the presumed object of regulation is to control the eco-
42. For a more detailed discussion on the incentives of commissioners, see De Alessi,
supra note 1 at 2-4.
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nomic rate of return, proceedings typically rely on accounting data
that seldom reflect accurately the underlying economic variables.
Changes in the general level of prices introduce additional diver-
gences between accounting data and economic values. Retroactive
ratemaking, by increasing the frequency of adjustments when the
meaning of the underlying data is difficult to determine, creates
additional uncertainty regarding the outcome of the regulatory
process. And more uncertainty means higher costs.
G. Depletion of Capital During Inflationary Periods
Accounting records typically reflect historical costs. As a re-
sult, during periods of inflation, accounting data systematically un-
derstate the value of capital assets acquired in preceding years. Be-
cause the rate base is obtained from these accounting records, it is
understated. Note that the higher the rate of inflation, and the
longer it has persisted, the greater is the understatement.
What may be less obvious is that historical accounting meth-
ods also understate true production costs, which include the oppor-
tunity cost of the flow of services provided by the utility's assets. If
the value of the assets is understated, then the value of the ser-
vices they provide presumably is understated as well. As a result,
both the accounting profits and the accounting rate of return are
greater than their economic counterparts. Moreover, to the extent
that the rate of inflation is anticipated, the market rate of interest
will rise to reflect the higher cost of using resources earlier in time.
The higher interest rates represent an additional cost of doing
business.43
These considerations are particularly significant in the case of
public utilities, firms that typically use highly capital-intensive
production techniques. Thus, if the rate of return allowed by the
commission is tied to a rate base that understates the current
value of assets, then the utility's real earnings will be below the
rate justified by economic circumstances and will be insufficient to
compensate investors, maintain the capital stock, and attract new
funds for system expansion. The irony of all this, at least in the
case of electric utilities, is that consumerist policies result in higher
prices to consumers and lower reliability of the system."
43. For a recent discussion on the limitations of accounting data, see Fisher & Mc-
Gowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 Am.
EcON. REv. 82 (1983).
44. See Navarro, supra note 11.
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If retroactive ratemaking is used during inflationary periods to
keep the accounting rate of return equal to or less than some al-
lowed rate that is too low by current economic conditions, then it
will exacerbate the economic consequences discussed above. In
particular, a utility will be able to survive only by allowing services
to deteriorate and using up its capital stock. The longer the pro-
cess continues, the greater will be the deterioration and the greater
will be the threat to the actual survival of the firm.
H. Reduction of Investors' Wealth
Retroactive rate reductions effectively lower the utility's real-
ized rate of return, thereby reducing the net stream of income
available for distributions to shareholders. Shareholders of record
when the initial notice of retroactive rate reduction is given suffer
a capital loss. This loss is equal to the present value of the ex-
pected decrease in the utility's net revenue, and is due to this first
reduction and to all expected future retroactive rate reductions.
The loss occurs because an investor's stock certificate represents
the right to a fraction of the firm's net stream of income. When
that net stream is reduced, provided the opportunity cost of capi-
tal remains unchanged, its present value falls and the price of the
share is correspondingly reduced. Thereafter, share prices increase
or decrease, and investors gain or lose, depending upon how the
market-weighted, initial anticipations regarding the consequences
of the retroactive rate reductions are revised on the basis of subse-
quent information.
The evidence indicates that stricter regulation reduces inves-
tors' wealth."' For example, the accounting rate of return earned
by electric utilities in states that use original-cost valuation in
computing the rate base typically is lower than the rate of return
earned by firms in states that use less strict, fair-value standards."
I. Transfer of the Risk-Bearing Function from Investors to
Consumers
Perhaps the most important consequences of retroactive
45. See, e.g., Pike, Residential Electric Rates and Regulation, 7 Q. REv. ECON. & Bus.,
Summer 1967, at 45; Primeaux, Rate Base Methods and Realized Rates of Return: Reply,
17 ECON. INQUIRY 300 (1979); Primeaux, Rate Base Methods and Realized Rates of Return,
16 ECON. INQUIRY 95 (1978); Rock, Rate Base Methods and Realized Rate of Return: Com-
ment, 17 ECON. INQUIRY 297 (1979).
46. See sources cited supra note 45.
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ratemaking relate to the risk-bearing and monitoring functions.
Recent theoretical advances suggest that the firm may best be
viewed as a set of contractual arrangements among owners of
jointly used, cooperating resources.47 Firms are organized to lower
the cost of monitoring the exchange and utilization of these re-
sources. The shareholders, who are the residual claimants, are the
owners of those assets that are specialized to the firm. Thus, share-
holders bear the risk of changes in the market value of the firm.
The more shares they own, the greater the proportion of any gains
they will reap from monitoring. As a result, shareholders, by as-
suming the risk of fluctuations in the firm's earnings, have a
greater incentive to monitor the firm's performance than do the
owners of other resources used in the firm's operations.
Under retroactive ratemaking, commissioners have the oppor-
tunity to vary a utility's prices instantaneously and continuously to
keep the realized rate of return from exceeding the allowed rate.
Managers of public utilities, on the other hand, have the incentive
to file for interim rate increases to prevent the realized rate of re-
turn from falling below the allowed rate. Thus, under reasonable
conditions, the rate of return earned by shareholders will be equal
to the allowed rate and relatively stable. If the utility is operating
at a loss, however, shareholders will be the first to bear the brunt.
For all practical purposes, shareholders will become just. another,
riskier class of bondholders. The prices paid by consumers, on the
other hand, will vary continuously as the commission imposes price
reductions retroactively and the utility adopts interim price in-
creases more frequently, with a greater proportion of these price
increases in time proving unjustified and requiring refunds. Effec-
tive prices, that is, nominal prices minus potential refunds, will
fluctuate continuously in response to changing expectations re-
garding the likelihood and amount of any ultimate refund.
The risk associated with changes in the utility's earnings, ordi-
narily borne voluntarily by investors-who are specialists in risk-
bearing-will shift to consumers who have no obvious advantage in
dealing with it. To the extent that shareholders have a compara-
47. Klein, Crawford & Alchian, Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents and the
Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978); see also Alchian & Demsetz,
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. EcON. REv. 777 (1972);
Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. EcON. 288 (1980); Jensen &
Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Struc-
ture, 3 J. FIN. EcON. 305 (1976); Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance
of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & EON. 233 (1979).
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tive advantage in bearing risk, shifting the risk to consumers im-
plies that the cost of risk-bearing will increase. Closer involvement
by the commission in the utility's day-to-day operations will in-
crease the probability of decisions which, from a profit-maximiza-
tion perspective, appear to be erratic, causing a further rise in the
cost of risk-bearing. Thus, retroactive ratemaking's effect on the
cost of risk-bearing will result in higher prices to consumers.
This analysis suggests that utilities will find it costlier to float
new stock issues and will be induced to shift toward more bond
financing. A reduced equity, however, implies higher risk for bond-
holders, and utilities will thus have to pay higher interest rates.
Published evidence supports these implications.48 Bonds is-
sued by utilities located in states with less favorable regulatory cli-
mates typically receive lower ratings and yield higher interest
rates. Moreover, the ratio of the market price of a utility's common
stock to its book value is significantly lower in states with less
favorable regulatory climates, reflecting an increase in the cost of
equity capital. Indeed, a shift in regulatory climate from very
favorable to unfavorable seems to entail an increase of approxi-
mately two percentage points in the cost of both equity and debt
capital.
J. Transfer of the Monitoring Function from Investors to the
Commission
As noted in the last section, retroactive ratemaking effectively
converts shareholders into bondholders. Because the rate of return
they earn is fixed by the commission and is relatively stable, inves-
tors are unable to capture the gains from improved operations.
Thus, these investors have little incentive to monitor management.
Individual consumers bear the consequences, through continu-
ous variations in price, of unanticipated changes in the utility's
value. Individual consumers, however, are able to capture only a
negligible portion of any gains from improved operations. Unlike
shareholders, consumers have no voting rights and their stake in
the utility's success cannot be capitalized and transferred to
others. Accordingly, consumers have virtually no incentive to
monitor.
48. See Archer, The Regulatory Effects on Cost of Capital in Electric Utilities, 107
PuB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 26, 1981, at 36; Trout, The Regulatory Factor and Electric Utility
Common Stocks Investment Values, 104 PuB. UTIL. FORT., Nov. 22, 1979, at 28. For a more
detailed summary of this and related evidence, see Navarro, supra note 2.
[Vol. 37:433
RETROACTIVE REGULATION
Regulatory commissions are already involved in monitoring
the firm's records and price decisions. As a utility's financial posi-
tion deteriorates, the commission will have the incentive to moni-
tor more closely the managers' operating decisions in order to in-
hibit inefficiency. Indeed, regulators would become progressively
more involved in the utility's day-to-day decisionmaking process,
thereby effectively taking over many traditional managerial func-
tions. In extreme cases, a commission would simply find itself man-
aging the utility. For all practical purposes, the utility would have
been nationalized, i.e., converted to public ownership. Finally,
commissioners also are unable to capture the full gains from any
improvement in the operation of the firm. Accordingly, they too
would have limited incentive to monitor effectively.
IV. CONCLUSION
The analysis presented in this paper suggests that the appar-
ent benefits to consumers of permitting public service commissions
to implement retroactive rate reductions are deceptive. Retroactive
refunds clearly result in lower prices to users during the initial pe-
riod covered. Higher prices and lower-quality output in subsequent
periods, however, will more than offset this initial reduction.
In particular, theory and evidence suggest that retroactive
ratemaking results in higher production costs and more variance in
input combinations; less incentive to develop and adopt cost-re-
ducing production techniques, to develop and introduce quality
changes desired by consumers, and to adopt cost-related prices;
more requests for interim price increases from utilities; higher
ratemaking costs; lower shareholders' wealth; and the transfer of at
least some of the risk-bearing and monitoring functions from
shareholders to the commission and to consumers.
In the long run, retroactive rate reduction will result in higher
prices to consumers, lower quality of output, and lower returns to
investors. Inefficient production associated with the partial nation-
alization of the firms will consume resources that otherwise could
have been used to benefit both consumers and producers.
Periods of inflation, myopic consumerist pressures, and swings
in national policies, e.g., towards the environment, all contribute to
uncertainty and exacerbate the debilitating effects of retroactive
ratemaking. In this context, more informed legislative and judicial
decisions will be crucial in maintaining the ability of public utili-
ties to serve consumers and to survive.
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